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THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990:
A SOLUTION OR A PROBLEM?
I. Overview
The signing of the Oil Pollution Control Act of 1990, Public
Law 101-380, (OPA '90) on August 18, 1990 was a significant
landmark in the struggle to control pollution by oil and the
activities associated with the recovery, transport, and refinement
of oil and associated products in the territorial waters of the United
States, and was long overdue. The aftermath of the Exxon Valdez
spill, which was the impetus that finally prodded Congress to pass
the oil spill legislation that had been under consideration for years,
has been filled with controversy over how the spill occu rred. how
the clean up was handled, how the payment of compensation to the
victims involved will be handled, environmental damage, and the
question of how safe are these tankers that are daily operating in
U.S . waters. All agreed that the situation with regard to oil spills
and oil transport as existed under U.S. law prior to the passage of
OPA '90 was untenable and had to be modified. The question
remains, however, as to whether OPA '90 as currently written is the
solution that was required or not. As with all legislation that is
concerned with preventing damage to the environment and with
correcting the damage that does occur, there will be costs to
society that will have to be incurred to carry out these programs.
These costs may be viewed as being applied to a specific industry or
industries, as in this case the oil industry and the related portion of
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the shipping industry involved with the transport of oil and oil
products, but eventually society as a whole pays a portion of these
costs, either in the form of higher prices, lost jobs, higher taxes,
lower return on capital investment, or in damage to the environment.
This paper is a discussion of provisions of OPA '90, whether this
was sound legislation or a hurried response to a public outcry, the
possible effects of OPA '90 on the shipping industry and oil industry
as well as related industries, and some proposals on where OPA '90
needs to be amended and how to best induce cooperation and
compliance from the shipping and oil industries. As this is an
ongoing issue with new facts and details coming to light almost
daily, this paper will be restricted to the state of events as of
September 1991.
II. Background
A. What caused OPA '90 to come about.
1. Recent History of Oil Spills:
Oil is the fuel of modern industry. The Western industrialized
nations are heavily dependant on oil imported from the oil producing
nations, particularly from the members of the OPEC cartel. The
primary method of transporting the oil is by tanker, since many of
the industrialized nations of the world do not have a readily
available supply of oil close at hand. Even nations such as the United
States, with a large supply of indigenous oil, imports up to fifty
percent of its oil requirements from other nations simply because
the foreign oil is cheaper than many of the domestic sources . In
addition, the United States transports 25 per cent of its domestic
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production' by tanker from the Alaskan port of Valdez, the terminus
of the Trans-Alaskan Oil Pipeline, to other U. S. ports. The Global
2000 Report to the President of the United States by the United
States Council on Environmental Quality (1980) estimated that there
would be a 3.3 to 4.4 percent annual increase in the demand for oil.
The first tanker (a ship carrying oil in tanks as opposed to
barrels) was built in 1885, and the first diesel-powered ship
crossed the Atlantic in 1911 . These developments, while a boon to
world shipping, were also the beginning of oil pollution at sea as
ships switched from coal as a fuel, which was not a serious threat
to the oceans, to oil, which definitely was. Evidence of oil pollution
along European coasts was becoming widespread during World War I,
mostly due to shipping lost as a result of the war. A recent article
in IMQ News stated that in 1928, according to the Financial Times
of London, 500,000 barrels of oil a year were being dumped into the
sea by ships, mostly as a result of routine operations.s
Oil and petroleum-related products are shipped principally by
sea due to the relatively inexpensive costs per ton of water-borne
transport. This includes transport by barge along coastal waters, as
opposed to pipelines, rail or truck. Water pollution from tankers and
barges, both as a result of accidental spills and from routine
discharges during normal operations is estimated to be at a level of
2.13 million metric tons per year. 3 Accidental oil spills are
, "Key sections of Alaskan Pipeline are rusting:..... , The New York Times, April 1,1990.
2 IMO News, No.3, 1990, pg 6.
3. Bill Shaw, Brenda Winslett, & Frank Cross. "The Global Environment: A Proposal to
Eliminate Marine Oil Pollution", Natural Resources Journal, Winter 1987, pg 162 -
163.
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believed to account for approximately 25 per cent of this total.s
Until relatively recently oil spills and operational discharges were
considered to be of minor impact and little attention was paid to the
effects of this pollution. Since the Torrey Canyon disaster in 1967
public attention to oil spills and their effects has grown,
culminating in the United States with the outcry that followed the
string of spills in 1989 starting with the Exxon Valdez in Alaska
(March); the World Prodigy in Narragansett Bay (June); a tug and
barge in the Houston Ship Channel (June); and the Presidente Rivera
in the Delaware River (June) ; as well as the February 1990 spill by
the American Trader off the shore of Huntington Beach, California.
These spills, combined with the growing concern over water quality
in the wake of rising public outcry over such issues as plastic waste
at sea and the discovery of medical waste on beaches, finally
prodded Congress into action and produced OPA '90.
Operational discharges while on the high seas are a serious
problem and also need to be dealt with, but the most notorious oil
spills have occurred in or near coastal waters and the effects of a
spill in these waters are nothing short of devastating to the
environment. The United States suffers about 7,000 spills per year ,
and about 1,000 of these are serious.s While most of these are
not at the level of the Exxon Valdez incident (to say nothing of the
1978 Amoco Cadiz disaster that was over six times the size of the
Exxon Valdez spill or of the IXTOC #1 blowout that was eleven
4. Ibid, pg 59.
5. E. Badolato, "Learning From the Exxon Valdez", U,$. Nayal Institute Proceedings,
October 1989, pg 110.
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times the size of Exxon Valdez), the effect on the local environment
of even a relatively small spill such as the barge Florida in
Buzzards Bay, Massachusetts in 1969 can still be both wide ranging
and pervasive. George Hampson of Woods Hole Oceanographic
Institute noted that twenty years after the Florida spill the effects
on the local environment can still be clearly seen. s The cost to
society of these spills is tremendous , both in monetary terms (the
Amoco Cadiz spill cost $30 million in 1978 to clean up,? while the
last estimate on the Exxon Valdez clean up may be as high as $2
billion on top of the recent settlement for just over $1 billion for
fines!) as well as damage to the environment, the cost of which is
still not completely understood but will certainly grow as our
knowledge about the long-term effects of oil spills increases.
2. Rational or reactionary legislation?
Congress had been struggling with the issue of oil pollution
since the passage of the Federal Water Quality Improvement Act in
1970. Congress has made several attempts over the last fifteen
years to pass a comprehensive oil spill bill and create a uniform
national program.s Passage of the legislation by the Senate proved
to be the stumbling block for these bills.
Prior to the Exxon Valdez incident the emphasis had been on
attempting to ratify the 1984 Protocols to the International
6. Presentation to the University of Rhode Island Marine Affairs Seminar, November 6,
1990.
7. Shaw et al, "The Global Environment..", pg 158.
8. T. Wagner, "The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: An Analysis", Journal of Maritime Law and
Commerce, Vol. 21, No.4, October 1990, pg 571.
5
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC) and the
International Convention for the Establishment of an International
Fund for Oil Pollution Damage (Fund), a position strongly endorsed by
the Commandant of the Coast Guard? , Admiral Kime. These
Protocols, (discussed in detail in section II.C) would have together
provided a maximum of approximately $260 million compensation
per incident for the cleanup of oil spills and to the victims of these
spills, above and beyond the coverage provided by the vessels'
rnsurance.tv The Coast Guard had been the U.S. representative to the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) conference on the 1984
Protocols and had consulted closely with Congress as to the major
domestic objectives that needed to be met during the conterence.t '
In fact, the original wording of the Protocols were negated at the
direction of the Senate, and concessions were made to the U.S.
position (principally to raise the limits of compensation to the
present level) with the understanding that the U.S. would ratify then
the Protocols .tv When the U.S. failed to do so, we were seen as
having negotiated in bad faith and as such having little creditability
(or leverage) in future negotiations.
A major point of contention during debate over the Protocols in
Congress had been the issue of preemption of states authority to
impose regulations and liabilities. The majority of these objectives
9. U.S. Congress, House, Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, Coast Guard and
Navigation Sub-Committee, Future of the U. S. Coast Guard, Hearing , June 1990. pg
68.
10. U.S. Congress, House, Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, Coast Guard and
Navigation Sub-Committee. Inyestigation into Coastal Ojl Spills, Hearing, June 21,
1990, pg 4.
11. Wagner. pg 572.
12. Inyestigation into Coastal Oil Spills. pg 6.
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were met, but the Senate still would not ratify the Protocols after
they had been submitted by the Reagan Administration. The refusal
of the Senate to budge on this issue of preemption is an unfortunate
case of short-sighted politics, as without the international
Protocols in force, a jUdgement by a U.S. court cannot reach a foreign
corporation unless that company has assets in the U.S., as the U.S.
has no agreements with any other country to enforce such a
judgement. 13 If a vessel was not bound for a U.S. port but was only
proceeding in innocent passage through U.S. waters, the U.S. would
not have jurisdiction to take the owner of the ship to court in the
event of an accident. Admiral Kime had recommended adoption of
the Protocols as they contained specific language that would make a
lawsuit settled in a U.S. court binding in both the flag state of the
vessel that caused the spill as well as the country where the
insurance policy for the vessel was written, so long as all of the
states were party to the Protocols. 14 Settlement of many claims
under the Protocols have been processed without litigation. 15 This
would be far more preferable than a case such as the Torrey Canyon
spill, where the owner simply walked away from the disaster
leaving the victims with no legal recourse. The House passed
legislation during the next three sessions that would have
implemented the Protocols but the Senate still refused to act. The
oil industry wanted one unified code of oil pollut ion legislation to
13. U.S. Congress, House, Public Works and Transportation Committee, Water
Resources Subcommittee, Oil Spill Liability and Compensation, Hearing, June 28,
1989,pg 79 - 80.
14. Inyestigation into Coastal Oil Spills, 26 - 27.
15. OJ! Spill Liability and Compensation, pg 40 . 41.
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deal with but the states want to maintain their rights to control
their local waters, and the Senate leadership would not budge. The
Exxon Valdez disaster was the impetus for moving the debate
forward towards a resolution.
The original bill that was introduced to the 101st session of
Congress as H.R. 1465 was substantially altered when it was finally
passed and signed into law as OPA '90. State law was not preempted
(the major objection of the Senate to previous legislation) and the
international protocols were not implemented. These
recommendations, given by many agencies, including the
Commandant of the Coast Guard and the State Department, in
testimony before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, were ignored in the effort to pass a comprehensive bill.
OPA '90, which was drafted as a comprehensive bill to prevent and
clean up oil spills, goes on to detail a myriad of activities , such as
the requirement for double hulls on tankers, the establishment of oil
spill response teams, installation of Vessel Traffic Systems in
various ports, and so on. Most importantly, the liability limits are
much higher than would be available under the Protocols, and a $1
billion Oil Spill Compensation Fund was created, in recognition of
the fact that a spill such as the Exxon Valdez would cause damage
that would require an extensive (and expensive) clean up. OPA '90
was a political compromise passed to satisfy the call to do
something, not to solve a major problem with a rational solution.
B. Review of specific provisions of OPA '90
1. New regulations:
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Genera./..;, The passage of OPA '90 has resulted in a number of
significant changes to national regulations concerned with oil
transport and oil spills . The law finally consolidated the various,
often conflicting pieces of legislation that previously were used to
prevent oil spills and determine liability in the event of an oil spill.
OPA '90 did not preempt state laws nor did it implement any
international oil spill conventions. Areas covered under OPA '90
include liability, compensation for damages from an oil spill,
prevention, removal of a spill, and penalties for failure to comply
with the new regulations concerning oil spills .
The legislation that was superceded or amended by OPA '90
included the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 (FWPCA),
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973 (TAPA), the
Deepwater Ports Act of 1974 (DPA) and the Outer-Continental Shelf
Lands Act Amendments of 1978 (OCSLA) .
Liability: OPA '90 imposes strict, joint and several liability
for removal costs and damages upon each responsible party for
discharge of oil from vessels and facilities into navigable waters,
onto adjoining shorelines, or into waters within the exclusive
economic zone of the United States.' 6 Strict liability means that a
polluter who causes a discharge to occur is found to be at fault,
unless it can be shown that the discharge was completely due to an
act outside of the control of the owner, such as an act of God or of
war. The owner then is completely responsible to pay for the clean
up costs . Joint and several liability means that if there are several
16. OPA 1990, section 1002(a}
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polluters, or several owners of a vessel (this can include the
operator and a charterer of a vessel as well as the owner in fact),
each one is responsible for the damages caused and will pay their
proportionate share of the costs to alleviate those damages. The
responsible party for a vessel is defined as the owner, operator or
demise charterer.!? Damages that may be included in claims are:
- Damage to natural resources
- Damage to real or personal property
- Loss of subsistence use
- Loss of government revenues and taxes
- Loss of profits and earning capacity
- Costs of increased or additional public services 18
The new limits of statutory liability and removal costs under
OPA '90 are as follows:
(1) the greater of $1,200 per gross ton or $10 million for
tank vessels of more than 3,000 tons;
(2) the greater of $1,200 per gross ton or $2 million for
tank vessels of less than 3,000 gross tons;
(3) the greater of $600 per gross ton or $500,000 for all
other vessels;
(4) $75 million, plus removal costs, for offshore
facilities;
(5) $350 million for onshore facilities and deepwater
ports .I ?
17. OPA 1990, section 1001
18. OPA 1990, section 1002(b)(2)
19. OPA 1990. section 1002(b)
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There is no limitation of liability if the incident was
proximately caused by gross negligence or willful misconduct, or by
a violation of a federal safety, construction or operation regulation
by the responsible party, its agent, employee or person acting
pursuant to a contract with the responsible party.20 Also, there is
no limitation if the responsible party "refuses or fails" to report the
incident, to provide reasonable assistance requested by a
responsible official, or to comply with certain FWPCA orders
without sufficient cause .21 The House version (H.R. 1465) originally
had provisions for Oil Cargo Owner Liability, which would have made
the cargo owner secondarily liable (after the vessel
owner/charterer) for the cost of damages as the result of a spil1.22
This provision caused quite a bit of concern for -the major oil
companies as this would have required them to have to screen the
safety record of the vessel carrying their oil , and to obtain coverage
in the event of a spill. The House felt that this would have been a
strong incentive for cargo owners to use high-grade transporters23
and therefore would have been useful in reducing the risk of an oil
spill, but the Senate did not agree. The assessment of risk is fairly
straight forward, as a cargo owner would only have to check with
Lloyd's Register of Shipping to determine what sort of risk a vessel
represented, and he would have had a reasonable idea of what sort of
risks he was taking. This provision was not included in the belief
that ownership of the oil would be too difficult to determine, as oil
20. OPA 1990, section 1004(c)(2)
21. OPA 1990, section 1004(c}(2)
22. H.R. 1465, section 1002, 101st Congress, First Session, November 15, 1989.
23. Oil Spill Liabjlity and Compensation, pg 167.
1 1
is often bought and sold several times during the voyage from the oil
field to the refinery. This failure to divide the responsibility
between operator and cargo owner is a serious mistake as there is
nothing to induce a cargo owner to use a quality vessel as opposed to
a one-ship "cowboy" corporation that has no assets in the event of a
spill to risk, and so takes only the very minimal precautlons.e-
financial Responsibility: Operators of vessels over 300 tons
entering the Exclusive Economic Zone of the U.S. are to be able to
prove financial security to at least cover the maximum liability
requirements under section 1004 of OPA '90. 2 5 This may be by a
certificate of financial responsibility issued by a P & I club, a
surety bond, or some other proof of sufficient resources. Failure to
comply with this provision can result in a fine as described below,
and may result in the denial of entry or detention of the vessel and
the vessel and oil carried as cargo will be subject to seizure and
forfeiture.
Compensation: OPA '90 also provides for funds to be available
for payment of pollution damages and for the costs of removal,
assessment, restoration and operational activities from the Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund, which was established under the Internal
Revenue Code as a five cents per barrel tax on oil imported into the
U.S .26 The Fund will be built up to a level of $1 billion, and will
also be available for payment of claims that are not covered by the
24. Editorial, Marine Log, December 1990, pg 3.
25. OPA 1990, section 1016.
26. OPA 1990, section 1012(a)
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responsible parties' liability coverage.
Prevention: Provisions of OPA '90 dealing with prevention of
oil spills include alcohol and drug testing, removal of the ship's
master if he is under the influence of alcohol or drugs, access to the
National Driver Register for applicants for mariner licenses,
manning standards for vessels, vessel traffic service systems,
establishment of a double hull requirement for tankers, and other
measures dealing with vessel safety devices and operation.2 7
Removal Responsibilities: In the wake of the confusion
surrounding the procedures for coordination of the clean up effort
for the Exxon Valdez spill, provisions were made to clarify
responsibility for the clean up. The President is now required to
"ensure effective and immediate removal" of a spill, direct and
monitor all federal, state and private actions as well as remove and
destroy a vessel that is discharging or threatening a discharge.2 8
OPA '90 also directs the National Contingency Plan for a worst-case
oil spill be revised, that a "national response unit" and ten Coast
Guard District response groups be created, and the preparation of
area, facility and vessel response plans. 2 9
OPA '90 and the amendments that it causes to the FWPCA do
not, however, expressly provide that the discharger must undertake
removal activities . He may be obligated to remove the spill by the
President or face severe penalties (discussion to follow) but the
statutory basis for this is not explicit.s ?
27. OPA 1990, Title IV.
28. OPA 1990, section 4201.
29. OPA 1990, sections 4201(b) and 4202.
30. Wagner, pg 576.
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Penalties: The criminal and civil penalties provided by OPA '90
for oil spill related acts are substantially increased and
administrative penalty authority is created in the Secretary of
Transportation and the EPA Administrator. Penalties include:
- Imprisonment of not more than three years (five if a
subsequent conviction) and a fine of not more than $250,000 for
failure to notify the appropriate federal agency of a spill.
- $10 ,000 fine per violation, not to exceed $25,000 for
multiple violations (Class I penalty) or $10,000 fine per violation,
not to exceed $125,000 for multiple violations (Class II penalty) for
discharging oil into navigational waters. There is now also a fine of
up to $25,000 per day of violation or $1,000 per barrel of oil spilled,
unless there is gross negligence or willful misconduct involved, in
which case the penalty is not less than $100,000 per day or $3,000
per barrel of oil spilled.
a fine of $25,000 per day for failure to comply with a
Presidential order concerning removal action.
- a fine of $25,000 per day for failure to comply with the
financial responsibility requirements .
- criminal penalties of $2,500 - $25,000 and one year in prison
for negligent violations, $5,000 - $50,000 and three years for
knowing violations, and up to $250,000 and 15 years for knowing
endangerment.3 1
31. OPA 1990, sections 4301and 4303.
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2. Studies that are required by OPA '90:
OPA '90 mandated thirty-one rules, regulations or studies that
are to be written or undertaken in the next few years. Some were
to be completed within six months of the signing of OPA '90, others
have no time limit. Some of these involve setting up procedures for
carrying out provisions of OPA '90, such as what constitutes
evidence of financial responsibility , how the assessment of natural
resources damage is carried out, and regulations for obligating the
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund . Others include studies of the
deepwater ports to assess risks and costs versus regular ports,
whether vessel traffic systems are required or need to be expanded
for U.S. ports, and various construction, manning and safety
standards for tankers. The full impact of these various provisions
are not known at present, and will not be until the studies are
completed and the regulations written, but the scope of issues that
they deal with promise that the impact on the oil shipping industry
will be significant and the manner in which the industry operates
will be significantly altered.
3. The effect of OPA '90 on certain government
agencies: Several government agencies will be directly
impacted by provisions of OPA '90, and others will be effected as
the various regulations and studies mandated by OPA '90 are carried
out. The President is charged with a number of responsibilities
including being responsible for ensuring clean up operations are
carried out, amending the National Contingency Plan for a worst case
oil spill, reviewing state and local oil spill contingency plans,
conduct inspections of oil spill removal equipment, designate
1 5
inspections of oil spill removal equipment, designate procedures for
obligating money from the Oil Spill Fund, and making adjustments to
the liability limits. The Administrator of the EPA and the Secretary
of Transportation, as noted earlier, have the authority to bring civil
and criminal charges against a discharger of oil. NOAA is to
promulgate procedures and regulations concerning the assessment of
natural resource damages. But by far the agency that is most
effected by OPA '90 is the Coast Guard, as the agent charged to carry
out many of the responsibilities assigned to the Secretary of
Transportation. The Act specifically assigned 16 different rules.
regulations and guidance to be issued by the Department of
Transportation, which will be carried out by the Coast Guard, as will
the five reports that were also tasked by OPA '90 to the Department
of Transportation. These include many of the technical regulations
such as tanker safety devices, when tankers may operate on
automatic pilot, the specifics of the double hull requirements, and
where single hull tankers must be escorted by tugs. The new tasking
under OPA '90 will require additional funding, but the specific
amount has yet to be identified as was brought out by the
Commandant of the Coast Guard during the FY '91 budget hearings .3 2
He also noted that a Vessel Traffic Service System (VTS) costs $25
- $30 million each, and none had yet been funded .33 The fear that
3~tIS. Congress~House. Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, Coas.t Guard ~nd
Navigation Sub-Committee, Coast Guard Budget - Fiscal Year 1991, Heanng, Apnl
1990, pg 69.
33. Ibid, pg 20.
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the Coast Guard has is that the new tasking it has been given will
not be accompanied by sufficient funding, as was the case with the
direction for the Coast Guard to take a larger role in the drug war,
and the leadership is worried that the resources required to carry
out these new taskings will come at the expense of other
programs.3 4
C. Comparison of OPA '90 to international agreements
Since OPA '90 did not ratify current international
protocols, the question which must be asked is: Has the passage of
OPA '90 helped the international effort or has it undermined the
attempts of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to reach a
widespread agreement on controlling oil pollution? In passing this
legislation, has the U.S. Congress provided visionary legislation that
will lead the rest of the world down a path resulting in safer tanker
operations worldwide, or has the international shipping industry
been faced with a new, unique standard that will apply to operating
only in the U.S. market and will force the shipowners to make some
hard choices as to whether to continue to service that market?
Could existing conventions and protocols have provided the required
controls to prevent oil spills that Congress sought by passing OPA
'90? This section is a review of both existing and proposed
international agreements and a discussion as to how effective they
have been in controlling oil pollution.
1. Background
34. U.S. Congress, House, Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, Coast Guard and
Navigation Sub-Committee. U,S. Coast Guard Aids to Navigation Mission., Hearing,
February 1990, pg 28.
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Since the United Nations was first organized after World War
" there have been attempts to organize an international effort to
control oil pollution, with varying degrees of success. The Torrey
Canyon disaster in 1967 was a major incentive to produce more
effective international agreements , and the work continues through
today. The United States has supported the majority of these
efforts, although there have been disagreements over specifics, such
as the appropriate liability limits for shipowners involved in tanker
accidents. The passage of OPA '90 now takes the U.S. down a
different road than the rest of the international shipping community.
OPA '90 contains several provisions that are not part of any current
or proposed international agreements, including · the requirement for
double-bottomed tankers, and the possibility of a shipowner
involved in a tanker mishap facing unlimited liability for the cleanup
of the accident as well as claims for damages.
2. History of International Conventions
Shipping has long been recognized as an international activity ,
and as shipping activity increased during the twentieth century the
need for international rules and standards to promote marine safety
and prevent pollution also increased . Prior to World War II several
attempts had been made by both the U.S. and the United Kingdom to
achieve an international convention on controlling oil pollution but
none succeeded.
After the creation of the United Nations the need for
international controls on oil pollution was seen to be even more
pressing, as oil pollution from both oil spills and from routine
discharges (pumping oily bilge water overboard and cleaning oily
1 8
residues from tanks) was increasing at an alarming rate. By 1953
more than 250 million tons of oil were being transported annually
(four times the pre-war figure) and over half of the total was crude
oil as opposed to refined petroleum products, which is far more
dangerous to the environment.35 The United Nations created an
agency to administer international policy and agreements on
maritime matters through the Convention on the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), which was convened in
1948 and came into force in 1958. This agency is now known as the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) . The IMO began with 21
member states and now has 126 states plus one associate member.36
In 1954, since the IMCO convention was not yet in force, the
United Kingdom took the initiative to convene an international
conference that resulted in the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954 (OILPOL), the first
international treaty concerning pollution from ships to be adopted.
The primary feature of this convention was the establishment of
zones extending 50 miles from land where the discharge of oil and
oily mixtures in excess of 100 ppm were prohibited. Reception
facilities in ports to accept oily wastes were also required. The
IMCO was named as the agency to administer the convention as soon
as it came into being. This occurred in 1958, the same year that the
OILPOL convention came into force. The convention was amended in
1962 to extend the prohibited zones, to prohibit any discharge by
35. "Cleaner Oceans: The role of IMO in the 1990s", IMO News, No.3 1990, pg 6. .
36. Yoshiro Sasamura, "Implementation of MARPOL 73/78", proceedings of 1985 QII
Spill Conference, Library of Congress, 1985, pg 121.
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new ships of 20,000 tons or more, and extending the application of
the convention to tankers from 500 to 150 tons and above.
OILPOL 54/62 had intended for all tankers to avoid discharge
of oily mixtures into the sea as much as practical and retain them on
board until they could be offloaded in port to a reception facility.
Unfortunately, masters of ships of 20,000 tons or more were
allowed, under the convention, to discharge oily wastes at sea if
"special circumstances made it neither reasonable nor practical" to
retain them onboard. The lack of reception facilities in most ports
gave the masters this justification, and at sea discharges outside of
the prohibited zones were routine.
The tanker industry, recognizing that if nothing was done to
reduce discharges stiffer legislation may follow, and to save more
of the oil for processing rather than being lost overboard, developed
the load-an-top procedure, in which dirty ballast and tank washing
water are retained on board, the oil allowed to separate from the
water, and the (relatively) clean water pumped overboard while the
oil is pumped into a slop tank. Further separation occurs, and more
water is pumped overboard. Upon arrival at the loading port, fresh
oil is pumped on top of the oil from the slop tank. Improved refining
techniques were able to utilize this less pure oil, and the industry
estimated that this method saved 1.6 million tons of waste oil each
year from being lost at sea, both to the benefit of the oil industry
and the environment.3 7
37. "Cleaner Oceans...". pg 7.
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In 1969 the IMO adopted new discharge criteria as amendments
to OILPOL 54. These amendments prohibited discharges except when
a tanker was: proceeding enroute, was more than 50 miles from land,
the instantaneous rate of discharge did not exceed 60 liters per mile
and the total quantity discharged in ballast voyage did not exceed
1/15,000 of the total cargo carrying capacity. The 1969
amendments to OILPOL 54 could be met by tankers using the load-
on-top procedure.
In March, 1969, the Liberian flagged tanker Torrey Canyon ran
aground in international waters off the Cornwall coast of England
and 119,000 tons (36 million gallons) of crude oil washed ashore on
the coasts of England and France. Until this spill occurred the
emphasis of international controls had been on operational pollution.
Now the prospect of a tanker even larger than Torrey Canyon running
aground anywhere in the world provided the impetus to pass two new
conventions in 1969 . The International Convention Relating to
Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties
established the rights of a state to take action to prevent or
mitigate the danger of pollution by oil following accidents by ships
outside territorial waters, and entered into force in 1975. The other
act was the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage (CLC) . This placed strict liability for
compensation for damages resulting from an oil spill or discharge on
the owner of the ship from which the oil escaped. The limits of
liability of the shipowner were placed at $150 per ton of the vessel,
up to a limit of $14 million per incident.
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While it was recognized that these limits were too low to
provide adequate compensation in event of a major spill, it was
feared that higher limits would have prevented acceptance of the
convention by some nations, and then a shipowner would be able to
limit his liability to the residual value of the wrecked ship, which in
case of the Torrey Canyon could have been the value of a lifeboat
that was recovered ($50),38 the rest of the ship having been a total
loss. The International Convention for the Establishment of an
International Fund for the Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage
(Fund) was passed in 1971 to provide additional compensation to
victims of oil pollution in the event that the limits of the CLC
convention were inadequate. The fund provides up to $35 million per
incident (which can be raised to $70 million by the Fund's Assembly
if deemed necessary) after the compensation from the shipowner
under the CLC has been exhausted. The Fund is made up of
contributions from oil importers and entered into force in 1978. The
U. S., on the grounds that the limits of liability were too low, has
signed but not ratified either the CLC or Fund conventions. (Note: the
limitation amounts in the conventions are actually expressed in gold
francs, which are converted into Special Drawing Rights (SDR) of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the basis of 15 gold francs to
one SDR. The SDR are converted into national currencies in
accordance with daily quotations of the IMF. The original limits of
the CLC convention were 133 SORI ton, up to 14 million SORI
incident. The combined CLC/Fund limits were a total of 45 million
38. "Oil Spill Liability and Compensation". pg 47.
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SDR, since raised to 60 million SDR in 1987.)
The decade of the 1970s was the beginning of the
environmental movement, and the IMO met in 1973 to consider a new
convention to replace OILPOL 54/69 . The International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (MARPOL 73), was a
very ambitious attempt to reduce both operational pollution and
pollution from accidents, and it was extended to cover all types of
pollution at sea, such as sewage, garbage and other harmful
substances. Ratification was slow until more tanker accidents
occurred in 1976 and 1977, including the Argo Merchant spill in
December 1976. This led to another conference in 1978 where
MARPOL 73 was modified by the Protocol of 1978. The two
agreements are treated as one and are generally referred to as
MARPOL 73/78.
MARPOL 73/78 entered into force in October of 1983, and
contains provisions that are similar to OILPOL 54/69, but also has
several points that result in stronger requirements to prevent
pollution. "Oil" is more strictly defined as petroleum in any form to
include crude oil, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse and refined products
(other than petrochemicals); the total quantity of oil that can be
discharged by new tankers is not to exceed 1/30,000 of the total
cargo (half of the amount allowed under OILPOL 54/69); a
requirement that oil discharge monitoring and control systems as
well as oily-water separating equipment be used during discharge of
oil; and the creation of "special areas", where no discharge of oil or
oily waste is allowed, which presently are the Mediterranean Sea,
the Black Sea, Baltic Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Aden and the
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Red Sea. Other requirements that were introduced in this
convention included construction and equipment standards such as:
fitting tankers with oil discharge and monitoring equipment; ships
above 400 tons gross tonnage must have oily-water separating
equipment; tankers must have slop tanks of sufficient size to retain
onboard slops (oily residues and wastes) from tank washing, dirty
ballast, and oil residue; the incorporation of segregated ballast
tanks (SST) into new tankers of 20,000 tons or more of sufficient
size so that the vessel will not have to use oil tanks for ballast
except in severe weather conditions; crude oil washing (COW)
systems in new tankers that use crude oil instead of water to clean
tanks of residue; and existing tankers of 40,000 tons or more must
be provided with SST, CST (clean ballast tanks) or COW. Clean
ballast tanks are similar to SST except that SST systems use a
separate piping and pumping system from the oil cargo system while
CST uses the same piping and pumps: hence it is not a true
segregated system. Other standards limited the size of oil tanks (to
limit the amount of oil spilled if a tank is broken open) and the
placement of SST to protect cargo tanks from rupture in case of an
accident or grounding.39 The United States has ratified MARPOL
73/78.
MAR POL 73/78 went a long way to reduce the risk and
frequency of oil pollution, but did not eliminate it by any means as
was shown by the continuing occurrence of oil spills, notably the
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Amoco Cadiz spill off the coast of France in March 1978. Claims in
this case initially were for $2.2 billion but the recent award (which
is still under appeal) was for $85.2
million,40 well in excess of the amounts available to the claimants
under the CLC and Fund conventions.
In May 1984 the IMO adopted new levels of compensation that
would be more adequate in case of a major spill such as the Amoco
Cadiz.. The 1984 Protocol to the CLC convention raised the limits of
liability to 3 million SDR (approximately $4.06 million) per incident
for vessels up to 5000 tons, with an additional 420 SDR ($568) per
ton for each additional ton. Maximum liability is 59.7 million SDR
($80.8 million) per incident. The Protocol to the Fund convention
raises the maximum level of compensation under the two
conventions to 135 million SDR ($182.6 million) per incident. The
coverage would rise to 200 million SDR ($270 .5 million) when three
states with a total annual oil receipts of 600 million tons ratified
the treaty. Since the United States alone imported 450 million tons
in 1984, this higher limit would almost certainly apply if the U.S.
ratified the Protocols." The United States, through the Coast Guard
which is the U.S. representative to the IMO, was a key player in the
negotiations leading up to the 1984 Protocols. Various attempts
were made by Congress to pass legislation that would have adopted
the 1984 Protocols, but none were ever passed by both the Senate
40 B. Van Hanswyk, "The 1984 Protocols to the International Convention o.n Civil .Li~bility for Oil Pollution Damages and the International Fund for Compensation for .0 11
Pollution Damages: An Option for Needed Reform in Untied States Law", The InternatIonal
Lawyer, Summer 1988, pg 333.
41. Van Hanswyk, pg 325.
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and the House. Then came the Exxon Valdez spill and Congress
reacted with OPA '90. The failure of the United States to ratify the
1984 Protocols is a major reason that other countries have not
voted to put them in force until the course that the U.S. will take is
clarified, and the path of OPA '90 is not one that other countries are
willing to follow, so far.
3. Effectiveness of International Programs
The various conventions that have been passed by the IMO have
had success in reducing the amount of oil that has been discharged
both deliberately and accidently into the oceans of the world, and
have dealt fairly effectively with claims that have arisen from a
number of oil spills .
In 1990, the United Nations Group of Experts on the Scientific
Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP) stated in their report on the
State of the Marine Environment that "without the application of
OILPOL 54 and MAR POL 73/78 an estimated 8 to 10 million tons of
oil would enter the sea directly each year as a result of pumping out
oil-contaminated tank-cleaning or ballast water. The amount
entering the seas due to maritime accidents has also fallen greatly
in recent years thanks to the development of improved standards,
navigational aids, training and watchkeeping and traffic separation
schemes."42
According to the International Tanker Owners Pollution
Federation I the number of oil spills at sea has declined in the last
decade from an annual average of 670 events during the first five
42. "The State of the Marine Environment", GESAMP. UNEP, 1990, pg 92.
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years to 173 events over the last five . The figures for major
accidents (over 5000 barrels or 725 tons) are 20 and seven events
annually for the same periods.43 A decrease was noted in this
report in both the numbers of accidents and the rate at which they
where occurring. Lloyd's Register of Shipping showed the number of
serious casualties in tankers over 6000 tons averaged 2.5 per
hundred ships during 1977-1981 but a rate of only 1.8 from 1982-
1986. 44 While a reduction in the rate of accidents does not mean
that less oil is necessarily spilled in a given year, since a few large
accidents can result in a greater amount of oil lost than a larger
number of small spills would and the large spills, by their very size
would cause a devastating impact on the local environment, the
reduction is still a good sign that more attention is being paid to
safer tanker operations.
A study conducted by the U.S. Department of Transportation and
the Environmental Protection Agency on oil spills in the U.S. during
transport found that for the period 1972 to 1979 vessels had the
lowest rate of amount of oil spilled per billion ton-miles of product
carried per year when compared to pipelines, railroads and highways.
The pipelines had 50 times the spill rate of vessels (due to the large
average size of pipeline spills).45
The IMO reports that the incidence of oil spills at sea over
5000 barrels through 1988 has remained well below the rate of the
1970s, with an annual average of just over 8 per year versus 25 per
43. Ibid. pg 21.
44 . "State of the Marine Environment", pg 21. .
45. R. Walter et ai, "An Analysis of Oil Spills During Transport". ProceedlOgs of 1985
OJ! Spj!! Conference, Library of Congress, 1985, pg 157.
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year in the 1970s.46
International agreements have not only been effective in
reducing the amount of oil that is discharged into the ocean, but they
have also dealt fairly swiftly with the compensation of victims
injured by an oil spill. Through 1984, the Compensation Fund had
dealt with 20 incidents involving member states; 12 in Japan, one
off Indonesia and the rest in European waters. Sixteen incidents
had been partially or entirely settled as of 1984, often within
months of the incident, and the largest payment was in the case of
the Tanio spill, which involved a spill of 13,500 tons of oil along
the Brittany coast. The final amount of claims agreed to by the Fund
totalled FFr 350 million ($37.3 million), with 70 per cent payable
under the Fund limits at the time of FFr 245 million. The first
payment of 61 per cent of the accepted claims occurred within four
years of the lncldent.s? By way of contrast, the Amoco Cadiz
decision on damages awarded was rendered by a U.S. court in 1988,
almost ten years after the spill occurred,48 and payment to the
claimants has still not occurred due to appeals of the judgement in
progress.
In the case of small claims (under $1.5 million), the director
of the Fund can settle the claims without approval of the executive
committee. The director can also make provisional payments to
mitigate undue financial hardship by victims.
46.• Tanker Casualty Rate Remains Steady", IMO News, No.2 1989, pg 16.
47. R. Ganten, "The Tanio Spill: A Case History Illustrating the Work of the .
International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund", Proceedings of 1985 Oil Spill
Conference, Library of Congress, 1985, pg 138.
48. Van Hanswyk, pg 334.
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The Fund can settle claims quickly because it takes an active
role early on when a spill occurs, to ensure proper documentation of
damages is completed and claims are correctly filed, and to work
with the shipowner's insurer so that a quick, fair settlement is
reached. The Fund also has a small staff so that there are few
bureaucratic delays. Finally, the Fund has access to technical and
legal experts who ensure proper action is taken both for mitigation
of damages and for submission of claims.
4. Summary
The international conventions that are in force and the IMO
itself have proven to be very effective in reducing the level of oil
pollution in the worlds' oceans and in achieving a significant level of
international cooperation among the maritime nations. The IMO has
continued to work to combat oil pollution as was evidenced by a new
oil spill treaty that was signed by 90 nations at a conference in
November 1990, which calls for the establishment of national and
regional systems for responding to oil spills and for increased
international cooperation as well as all ships being required to have
contingency plans to deal with oil spills. 4 9 The next conference is
scheduled to take place in Brazil in 1992.
The actions of Congress in ignoring the 1984 Protocols and
passing OPA '90 have contributed to uncertainty in the shipping
industry and have raised the possibility of increasing the risk of oil
spills in U.S. waters as major companies decide the risk of unlimited
liability outweigh the potential gains and leave the market to small
49. J. Guy, "Looking for Solutions, Not Faults", Fairplay, 20/27th December 1990, pg
17 .
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carriers. Already Shell, Elf and Petrofina have said they will
boycott the U.S. market5 0 and others may follow. Additionally, by
not implementing the 1984 Protocols, Congress may have lost
access to these funds which would have been funded through oil
company contributions, and which could have been used to
compensate losses due to oil spills with the domestic fund as a
backup in case the limits of the international funds were exceeded.
Mr. Bill O'Neil, secretary general of the IMO stated the view of
the shipowners quite plainly in a recent article in Eairglay: "Owners
are not wrangling about standards. All they want is equal
application worldwide." A further point to consider is that if the U.S.
imposes restrictions and requirements on tankers that wish to
operate from U.S . ports, what is to prevent another country from
imposing restrictions on U.S. shipping, both tankers as well as other
types of shipping?
Finally, Dr . J. A. Crowley listed the advantages and
disadvantages of international conventions in a recent issue of !.MQ
News. The advantages are: equal degrees of safety for passengers
and crew, regardless of flag; free movement within all ports if
Convention requirements are met ; ease of enforcement by port
states since inspections are to Conventions' requirements; greater
expertise and experience available in formulating safety standards,
regulations and procedures; same standards apply to all ships,
allowing predictable behavior, economy of production and reduction
in unfair competition; new designs and innovations can be put to the
50. "Clubs Re-Think Tanker P&I Cover", L10yds Shipping Manager, September 1990.
pg 63.
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IMO for consideration and reactions of Member States; reduction in
costs to Member States in producing legislation and codes of
practice; assurance of respect by ships of Flag States of special
areas for pollution prevention pu rposes and traffic separation
schemes; and facilitation of co-operation in such things as
combating pollution. Some disadvantages listed by Dr. Cowley are:
Convention requirements depend on consensus and must be followed;
the pace of change of regulations is limited to a Convention's
procedural arrangements and time scale; and a two-thirds majority
of Parties to a Convention are required for an amendment.
Rules and standards relating to maritime safety and pollution
prevention should be discussed, agreed and implemented at an
international level. As a leading maritime nation, the- United States
needs to be a part of the international shipping community and not
operate as a loose cannon.
III. Impact of OPA '90 on the U.S. and world shipping
industry
A. Costs of Tanker Operations
While transporting oil by tanker may be the most cost-
effective method over long distances, it is not by any means a cheap
form of transportation to operate, especially for U. S. flag vessels.
As an example, a 200,000 ton tanker cost $90 million to build in the
U.S. in 1977, or $40 million to build in Japan. Crew costs for an
American crew were $1.7 million a year in 1977, while a Spanish
crew for the same period cost $450,000. 5 1 To these costs have to
51. Shaw et ai, "The Global Environment...", pg 161.
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be added fuel costs, pilotage and tug fees, provisioning costs, fees
for the agent in each port, wharfage charges, maintenance costs, and
insurance. With the passage of OPA '90 the limits for liability in
case of an oil spill have increased, and the costs for insurance to
provide coverage for liability in case of an oil spill will certainly
increase to a significantly higher level, although the exact amount
of this new level will not be resolved until OPA '90 has been
adjudicated in the courts as the result of some future incident that
occurs under its' provisions. More recent data on shipping costs (but
for the period just prior to the passage of OPA '90) based on
inquiries with New York based shipping agents indicate that the
approximate cost of opera.ting a 100,000 ton U.S. flag tanker (with
all of the above mentioned costs and fees included) is $30,000 per
day, and $10,000 per day for a foreign flag vessel. Vessels employed
in transporting cargo to the Middle East for Operation Desert Shield
were chartered at $57,000 per day. These figures are not
insignificant, and it must be remembered that the world shipping
industry is very competitive, and additional costs are not easily
passed along by shipowners to their customers. Therefore, the
additional cost of providing the double-hulled ships required by OPA
'90, and the cost of obtaining the liability bond to cover the vessel
in the event of the spill, not to mention the relative ease of proving
negligence under the provisions of OPA '90 which will allow suit to
be filed for the full cost of a spill, may lead many shipowners to
reach the conclusion stated by Professor Nixon of the University of
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Rhode Island Department of Marine Affairs52 that the risk of
operating tankers in U.S. waters is too high and that American oil
companies such as Exxon should get out of the tanker business. If
this were to occur, American shipping companies with more highly
inspected and regulated ships, better trained crews and better
maintained ships than many other nations would disappear from the
world shipping industry, causing a large number of secondary effects
such as further decline of the American shipbuilding and repair
industry, an even more serious lack of U.S flag ships to support the
armed forces in event of a conflict, and the further decline of the
merchant marine as a career for Americans. This would lead to
further transfer of U.S. flag ships to flags of convenience, with all
of the problems pointed out by Professors Shaw, Winslett and Cross
in their article "The Global Environment".53
In addition to these costs that would be faced by shipowners,
there are the costs associated with construction of double-hull
tankers (an increase of approximately ten per cent) that will be
required under OPA '90. OPA '90 allows double-hull tankers to be
phased in over time, and therefore the construction of these tankers
should not overly onerous to shipowners, but other costs will have
to be allowed for as well. The direct cost of construction of these
vessels may be as low as approximately five per cent more than the
cost of a single hulled ship54 , but the resulting tankers would be
52. Presentation to the University of Rhode Island Marine Affiars Seminar, October
30, 1990.
53. Shaw et ai, pg 162.
54. Robert J. Stewart, M Can Double Bottom Tankers Reduce Oil Pollution?", U,S. Nayal
Institute Proceedinas, June 1990, pg 82.
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larger than a single hulled ship with the same cargo capacity, and
therefore these ships would require channels to ports to be dredged
deeper, stronger piers to be built, and more tugs to be used during
docking and undocking. The advantages of double-hulled tankers
include prevention of oil spills (27 of 30 spills studied by the Coast
Guard would have been prevented by double hulls55 ), and the smooth
sided tanks that result from the ships' structural members being
located between the hulls as opposed to along the bottom and sides
of tanks in single hull ships, allowing easier cleaning of tanks and
faster discharge rates as well as more complete stripping of tanks,
resulting in less oil lost during transfer. Clean ballast tanks can be
located between the hulls, which will not only reduce or eliminate
the amount of oil pumped overboard during deballasting operations,
but will provide more protection in the event of a collision with the
tanks placed along the bottom and the sides of the vessel.
B. How will shipowners cope?
The reaction from the world shipping industry to OPA '90 was
one of shock and dismay, to say the least. Predictions of mass
withdrawal from the U.S. market, the collapse of the (pick one) oil
industry, shipping industry, marine insurance industry or Western
Civilization as we know it were all postulated at one time or
another. On the other hand, members of industry such as Douglas
Wolcott, the president of Chevron, has said that Chevron will fully
comply with OPA '90 and will operate as safely as possible in order
to avoid spills. Chevron will (he claims); maintain a top quality
55. Ibid, pg 86.
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owned fleet, reduce spot charter exposures, control crews, and
insist on superior insurance coverage. He also stated that Chevron
will continue to charter vessels, with a strict screening process for
prospective owners. Of great interest was his statement that
Chevron would indemnify these charters for the risks of trading to
the U.S.56 Another interesting development is the recent television
and magazine advertisements by Dupont, the owner of Conoco, which
proclaim that they are "pioneering the use of double hull tankers to
help safeguard the environment", despite the extra cost of double
hulls (15% is their estimate) and the reduction in oil carrying
capacity (a 10% loss is claimed). Dupont obviously believes that
safety and environmental concern is good for business, along the
same line as the automobile manufacturers who find that consumers
want safer cars and are willing to pay for them.
C. What is the potential effect on the American
consumer?
One thing that nearly everyone agrees on is that OPA '90 is
going to increase the cost of transporting oil to the U.S. and that
these costs are going to eventually be passed along to the American
consumer either directly by higher prices or indirectly by higher
taxes. While this will bring the inevitable outcry against the oil
companies and the government, the American public must be
educated to realize that the price of oil has been relatively flat over
the last decade when corrected for inflation and that the bill must
be paid to have a cleaner environment while at the same time
56. Presentation by Douglas Wolcott to the Connecticut Maritime Arbitrators luncheon,
November 29, 1990.
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maintaining the standard of living that we have come to expect as
our right as Americans. As consumers of petroleum products, we
must pay a share of the costs as a portion of our responsibility in
demanding these products in the first place.
The requirements of OPA '90 are almost certain to cause a rise
in oil prices directly and indirectly to the consumer due to the
deeply ingrained use of oil and petroleum products in our modern
society.
D. Will OPA '90 really reduce the risk of oil spills?
While OPA '90 will cause more equipment to be bought and
staged in preparation for the next spill and for contingency plans to
be drawn up, there is some question as to whether the coordination
of removal operations will proceed as smoothly as was envisioned
during the drafting of OPA '90. OPA '90 does not clearly designate
the federal government or the discharger as the agent primarily
responsible for removal operations. Under previous legislation, the
discharger was not statutorily responsible to conduct the removal,
and therefore his removal expenses were considered "voluntary" and
did not apply against the limit of the discharger's liability.57 Under
OPA '90, the President is directed to "ensure effective and
immediate" removal, and a discharger that fails or refuses to
comply with Presidential orders will face substantial penalties and
increased liability.58 While the government's role has been altered,
and a discharger's removal costs are no longer considered voluntary
so they may be counted against the overall liability of the
57. Wagner, pg 583.
58. OPA. 1003(c)(2) and (3); 1004(c)(2)(B) and (C); 4201 (a) and 4301 (b).
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discharger,59 it is not clear whether the government has been
placed in a substantially different role as to management of the
removal operation than it was under the FWPCA.6o OPA '90
mandates that under the National Contingency Plan the on-scene
coordinator, the Coast Guard, the national response team, the area
committee representatives and state officials must coordinate their
actions with each other. 6 1 A responsible party trying to respond to
all of these groups will have a difficult time doing so and cleaning
up the oil spill at the same time. A single agency should have been
given overall responsibility to direct removal operations.
Another significant question is whether OPA '90 cause
companies such as Exxon to leave the tanker business and leave the
field to small one ship corporations using older, less seaworthy
vessels that are out to make maximum profits and will have no
assets worth pursuing in the event of another major spill. Combined
with this is the question of where will a company get the required
certificates of financial responsibility, as the international
insurance groups have stated that they do not intend to issue
certificates for more than the amounts required under current
international conventions and the Federal Pollution Control Act. 6 2
Chevron, as noted earlier, has vowed to remain in the business and
avoid catastrophe by doing a better job. How successful they will be
at avoiding an oil spill and remaining profitable remains to be seen.
59. OPA 1004(a)
60. Wagner, pg 583.
61. OPA section 4202.
62. Anthony B. Clark, "Implications of US Oil Pollution Act 1990", fairplay, 27
September 1990, pg 47.
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E. Will OPA '90 speed up the compensation process?
One goal of OPA '90 was to expedite the claims for
compensation in the manner outlined under international legislation,
so that a similar situation to the Amoco Cadiz case or the Exxon
Valdez does not occur where many years pass before victims can be
compensated. Initially OPA '90 does succeed by providing a
procedure for claims to be filed against the responsible party and
then against the compensation fund. At this point, however, the
person filing the claim must then choose whether to pursue his
claim additionally among the state, common law or maritime venues
that are available. If the claimant does so, these claims have to be
adjudicated to completion before he can receive any compensations
from the fund . Without preemption of other laws the claims process
is slowed by identical claims being adjudicated in multiple courts.
A single forum should have jurisdiction to resolve all claims so as
to reduce the time and costs of litigation and thereby provide
compensation to victims in the shortest amount of time feasible,
similar to the procedures used under the International Fund
Protocols.
IV. Suggestions to allow the shipping industry to survive
and still reduce the risk of oil spills
A. Compliance With OPA '90
Up to this point we have seen that OPA '90 may cause
significant increases to the cost of operations of the oil and
shipping industries, but the cost of cleaning up after any accidents
is so high and the effects on the environment so pervasive (and still
not totally known) the position of the U.S. government that
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prevention of oil spills is cheaper in the long run than cleaning up
after them (and living with the effects) would seem to be the best
course to follow for society as a whole. While it is feasible to
simply dictate to the oil industry to comply with all provisions of
OPA '90, this may lead to a further reduction in the U.S. merchant
marine industry as companies simply decide it is too expensive to
continue in the shipping business. The following ideas may serve to
achieve the desired reduction in risk of oil spills while still
allowing shipping companies to remain competitive.
1. Special ports/handling procedures
Designate certain ports as "oil handling ports". Some major
U.S. ports , such as Los Angeles/Long Beach, not only handle a large
percentage of oil tanker traffic, but they are also suited to being
utilized as an "oil handling port". This designation would be given to
strategically located ports that already are or could be easily
modified to handle large tankers alli1 contain any spill that might
result. Also, these ports would be located close to refineries to
process the oil. Los Angeles/Long Beach is a perfect example of
such a port. Refineries are already located there and the tanker
traffic is already significant. The harbor can handle very large
ships, is relatively easy to get in and out of, and there already is in
place an inner and outer harbor breakwater. This last point is
significant because it would allow tankers to wait at anchor safely
inside the outer breakwater while waiting to offload, and if a spill
were to occur it would be relatively easy to contain by closing off
the entrances through the breakwaters with oil booms. Once
designated as a oil handling port, emergency equipment could be
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staged there so as to quickly respond to any spill. To encourage
tankers to come to one of these ports the liability bond could be
reduced, which would lower the insurance rates for that vessel; or
high user fees would be charged for a tanker wanting to visit
another port. The oil could be transported from the refineries via
pipelines or rail, or via barge traffic that would be more closely
regulated than is currently the practice. By concentrating tanker
traffic to selected ports, oil spill response teams could concentrate
their efforts on these ports, resulting in a higher recovery level.
Since the ports would be built to handle oil spills, and could include
collection sites for oily ballast of the type proposed by Shaw et al6 3
, environmental damage would be minimized and since the ports
would be optimized for tanker traffic could actually speed up
turnaround time for the offloading or onloading operation.
2. Crew restructuring
Since most oil spills occur near or in the entrance to harbors
or traffic separation zones, a tanker could be encouraged to utilize
a team of large tugs and a pilot or special master to bring the tanker
in from the entrance to the pier. Rather than the current practice of
having tugs follow a ship until it is close to the pier with a pilot
providing guidance to the ships' master, the tugs would be made up
to the tanker and would drive it to the pier under direction of the
pilot or special master. The advantage of this arrangement is that
the pilot, with the local knowledge of the harbor and well practiced
at bringing such large ships in to the pier, would have effective
control with the tugs of the ship at the most dangerous part of the
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voyage and would be ready to respond to any emergency. Bringing a
large ship into a harbor is no easy matter. After a long voyage with
the minimum manned ships typical of todays' merchant fleet, a
ships' master can be fatigued and may be prone to mistakes. The
pilot with his team of special tugs (and perhaps some assistants
with the pilot to help with the navigation) would be able to safely
bring the tanker in to the harbor. This proposal could be combined
with the preceding one, and similar inducements (reduction of
liability premiums if the special team is used, or higher port fees if
they are not) could be offered.
In addition to the above proposal, a close look at the training
and certification of crews needs to be undertaken. As tanker
companies move toward ever smaller crews, these crews need to be
well trained so as to avoid another disaster like the Exxon Valdez.
There is a move in this direction on the international front, and the
U.S. needs to ensure that it follows suit. Standards such as are
followed by the aviation industry should be implemented and
followed, including such areas as crew rest so that an another
accident such as the World Prodigy spill, where the captain was
found to be exhausted and distracted by cargo calculationsv- , does
not occur. Time and again, studies have found that prevention is
cheaper than cleanup, and that the one area that is most often cited
as the cause of an accident is human error, either due to inadequate
training or some factor such as fatigue.
3. Offshore loading/unloading platforms
64. Andrea Panciera, "New laws, regulations abound after World Prodigy oil spill",
Providence Sunday Journal, June 23, 1991, pg B-2.
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As an alternative to entering port, with the attendant risks to
the vessel, it may be feasible to utilize offshore oil loading and
unloading systems, such as are in use in the North Sea drilling areas
and off of the Louisiana coast. The North Sea variants (such as the
Single Anchor Leg Mooring (SALM) and the Articulated Loading
Platform (ALP)) have been utilized in up to 530 feet of water65 and
could be connected by pipelines to shore facilities. The advantage of
these systems is that the loading and unloading operation could be
conducted away from sensitive areas. Unfortunately, these
facilities would also be located away from the shore and if a spill
were to occur the response time would be increased and containment
of the spill more difficult. The Louisiana Offshore Oil Platform
(LOOP) is located 18 miles offshore and has been operating
successfully since authorized in 1974, with a capacity of up to 1.4
million barrels/day, which is approximately 15 per cent of total
imports for the U.S.66 The lower risks of an oil spill from the LOOP
system were recognized in OPA '90 by the lower liability limits for
LOOP and the potential for these limits to be lowered even further.
This system will certainly be usable on off of certain types of
coasts, but it should be pursued where feasible as a proven,
practical alternative to bringing a tanker into port.
V. Conclusions
65. R. Curtis Crooke & Lloyd G. Otteman, 1984, "Offshore Oil and Gas Technology
Assessment", pg 229 in USGS Circular 929. Symposium Proceedings; A National
Program for the Assessment and Deyelopment of the Mineral Resources of the U.S.
Exclusiye Economic Zone.
66. U.S. Congress, House, Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, Coast Guard and
Navigation Sub-Committee, Inyestjgation into Coastal Ojl Spills, Hearing, June 21,
1990, pg 3.
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There is little doubt that the passage of the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990 was long overdue and vital to the continued fight against oil
pollution. Certain of the provisions of OPA '90 need to be amended in
order to provide a more viable program to control oil spills. These
include: ratification of the 1984 Protocols, with the OPA 90
Compensation Fund to act as a backup to the International Fund in
the event of a very large spill that will exceed the limits of the
International Fund and the CLC; designation of a single venue for the
adjudication of all claims, and preemption of the state laws with
regard to liability limits; and to clearly designate a single agency to
be responsible for the removal of an oil spill. Compliance with OPA
'90 as it now stands by the oil industry is required at least for the
short run, but with some imagination it may be feasible to achieve
the necessary protection from oil spills while at the same time
preventing the American merchant marine and related industries
from facing economic disaster. As an added benefit, since the U.S.
market is such a dominant force in the world, other nations' tanker
fleets will want to comply with U.S. regulations in order to have
continued access to the U.S. markets. This will result in more of the
worlds' tanker shipping being built and operated in a safer manner
and reduce the risk of oil spills worldwide, which is definitely to
the benefit of the entire world.
In conjunction with these amendments, a concerted effort has
to be made by the Administration and Congress to address the need
to develop alternative energy sources to oil as well as encourage
conservation of energy use, as there is no way to eliminate spills so
long as we continue to import vast quantities of oil and since the
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U.S. does not have the either potential or proven reserves to satisfy
our ever growing energy requirements, we have to break the oil habit
if we truly wish to prevent oil spills. As the Greenpeace
advertisement in the wake of the Exxon Valdez spill pointed out
with reference to Captain Hazelwood, "It wasn't his driving that
caused the Alaskan oil Spill. It was yours.".
44
Bibliography
Badolato, Edward. "Learning from the Exxon Valdez", U,S. Nayal
Institute Proceedings, October 1989.
Clark, Anthony B. "Implications of U.S. Oil Pollution Act 1990",
Fairplay, 27 September 1990.
"Cleaner Oceans: The role of IMO in the 1990s", IMO News, No.3,
1990.
"Clubs Re-Think Tanker P&I Cover", L1oyds' Shipping Manager,
September 1990.
Crooke, R. Curtis and Otteman, Lloyd G. "Offshore Oil and Gas
Technology Assessment", U.S. Geologic Survey Circular 929,
Symposium Proceedings: A National Program for the
Assessment and Deyelopment of the Mineral Resources of the
U.S. Exclusive EconQmic ZQne. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1984.
Ganten, R. "The Tanio Spill: A Case History Illustrating the Work of
the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund",
Proceedings of the 1985 Ojl Spill CQnference, Washington:
Library of Congress, 1985.
Guy, John. "Looking for Solutions, Not Faults", Fairplay. 20/27th
December 1990.
Healy, Nicholas J. and Sharpe, David J. Cases and Materials on
Admiralty. 2nd Ed.. St. Paul MN: West Publishing, 1986.
IMO/FAO/Unesco/WMO/WHO/lAENUN/UNEP JQint Group of Experts on
the Scientific Aspects Qf Marine Pollution (GESAMP): "The
State of the Marine Environment", Rep. Stud. GESAMP No. 39.
111pp.,1990.
Sasamura, Yoshlo. "Implementation of MARPOL 73/78", Proceedings
of 1985 Oil Spill CQnference, Washington: Library of Congress,
1985.
45
Shaw, Bill et al. "The Global Environment: A Proposal to Eliminate
Marine Oil Pollution", Natural Resources Journal, Winter
1987.
Stewart, Robert J. "Can Double Bottom Tankers Reduce Oil
Pollution?", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1990.
"Tanker Casualty Rate Remains Steady", IMO News, No.2, 1989.
U.S. Congress. House. Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, Sub-
Committee on Coast Guard and Navigation, Future of the U. S,
Coast Guard, Hearings. Washington, U.S. Govt . Print. Off., June
1990.
____ . Coast Guard Budget -
Fiscal Year 1991, Hearings. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
April 1990.
____ . Investigation into
Coastal Oil Spills, Hearings. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off "
June 1990.
____ . U,S. Coast Guard Aids
to Navigation Mission, Hearings. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print.
Off. , February 1990.
, Public Works and Transportation Committee,
Water Resources Subcommittee. Oil Spill Liability and
Compensation, Hearings. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
June 1989.
U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc. "An Act to Establish Limitations on
Liability for Damages Resulting from Oil Pollution, to
Establish a Fund for the Payment of Compensation for Such
Damages, and for Other Purposes," United States Statutes at
Large. Public Law 101-380, 101st Congress, 2d sess.
(Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1990.
Van Hanswyk, Beth. "The 1984 Protocols to the International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damages and the
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damages:
An Option for Needed Reform in United States Law", I.bJL
International Lawyer, Vol 22, No.2, Summer 1988.
46
Wagner, Thomas. "The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: An Analysis",
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, Vol. 21, No.4, October
1990.
Walter, R. et al. "An Analysis of Oil Spills During Transport",
Proceedings of 1985 Oil Spill Conference, Washington: Library
of Congress, 1985.
47
